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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and TELLURIDE POWER
CO:JIPANY,
Plaintiffs,

-vs.THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH and NEPHI
CITY,

Case No.
7803

Defendants.

Brief of Defendant Nephi City
NATURE OF THE CASE
Nephi City applied to the Public Service Commission of Utah for an order directing the Utah Power &
Light Company to sell power to the city of Nephi. The
point where Nephi ;as ·to take ·the power was ·at the
nearest point where Utah Power's facilities were adequate to serve Nephi. Utah Power did not file any
protest to this application, nor d"id it raise any objection
at the hearing. The Telluride Power Company interYened and protested. After the P.S.C. ordered Utah
1
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Power to sell to Nephi, both Utah Power and Telluride
filed petitions for rehearing. As a result of these petitions for rehearing, an amended order directing Utah
Power to sell to Nephi was entered. Both Telluride and
Utah Power instituted these proceedings to have the
correctness of the order reviewed by this court.
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

The statements of fact by Telluride and Utah Power
are adequate to reflect the nature of the controversy.
They do, however, contain erroneous assertions, two of
which involve the focal point of the case. The first
erroneous assertion is that Utah Power has never devoted any of its facilities to furnishing power for distribution south of Mona. This is directly contrary to the
evidence. Telluride purchases roughly half of all the
power distributed by it from Utah Po\ver. (R. · 198-200,
209.) It has been connected to Utah Power's system
since 1929. (R. 97.) The power from Utah Power is
being distributed in Nephi today and at the time of the
hearing and for many years prior thereto it was so distributed. The only change in this regard which would
be brought about by affirming the Commission's order
is that the power would be purchased at ~Iona by Nephi
instead of being purchased at Mona by Telluride. In
both instances the power will come from Utah Power,
and in both cases the power so purchased will be distributed south of ~Iona.
rrhere is considerable evidence in the. record from
the manager of Telluride (R. 198-200, 209) and from llfr.
2
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Irvine of Utah Power (R. 96-102) concerning the facilities for delivering electrical energy from Utah Power to
Telluride for distribution south of :\Iona. 1\lr. Irvine
testified that rtah Power operates a 44 k.v. substation
in Santaquin, rtah. This is connected directly with the
Olmsted Hydro-electric Plant and the Hale Steam Plant
near ProYo, rtah. These plants have a combined capacity of approximately 70,000 kx. Two 44 k.v. transmission
circuits extend from the Provo plants to the Santaquin
substation and then extend south to :\Iona, Utah, which
is the south boundary of r tah Power distribution system .
.A_t ).Iona, the two -t-! k.v. transmission circuits continue
southward but tht<y are owned by Telluride, and the
power is taken south for distribution in Telluride's
territory. Utah Power constructed these two 44 k.v.
transmission circuits to 1Iona for the express purpose
of selling large quantities of power to Telluride for distribution throughout Southern Utah. (R. 97 and 98.)
They come to a dead end insofar as Utah Power's system
is concerned (Ex. 1). The lines were thus designed and
built to interconnect with Telluride's system, which distributes throughout Southern ·Utah. The assertion that
Utah Power has never devoted any of its facilities to
generate and deliver power for consumption in the Nephi
area is thus directly contrary to the evidence. The only
change eontemplated will be that Nephi must construct
a new line from X ephi to :\Iona, and Nephi will purchase
direct from Utah Power, rather than to have the power
sold to Telluride and thence to Nephi. It is admitted
that Utah Power has adequate facilities to serve any
load which may be required by the city. {R:. 107.)
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rl,he second erroneous assertion is that Nephi City
is the territory of Telluride. Nephi City is a municipal
corporation, which has availed itself of its constitutional
and statutory right to build a municipal power plant. It
has not sufficient generating capacity to generate all the
power which it needs, and throughout the years it has
purchased additional power from various sources. For
the ten year period from 1924 to 1934, it purchased power
under contract from the town of Levan. (R. 127.) At a
later date (1934-1941) it purchased power from the Big
Springs Power Company (R. 128), at Fountain Green,
Utah, and during the past ten years it has purchased
power from Telluride. (R. 129.) Its purchase from the
town of Levan did not make it Levan's territory, nor did
its purchase from Big Springs Power Company make it
the territory of that company. rrelluride did not hesitate
in 1941 to take over this business from Big Springs Power
Company, nor did it apparently consider it was invading
Big Springs' territory. Since 1903 Nephi has had its own
plant. (R. 129.) During the first 39 years it made no purchases from Telluride, although Telluride was in business
in adjacent territories. Then in 1941, Nephi made a contract with Telluride. (R. 129.) Petitioners would have
the court believe that this contract converted Nephi into
Telluride territory. The city of X ephi is not the territory
of any utility. By electing to build its own plant, (as the
cases demonstrate) Nephi is in legal contemplation as
far removed from Telluride's territory as if it were
located in another state. Its contract to purchase power
from Utah Power will not convert it into the territory
of either. It is a municipality with power to build its
4
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own generating plant and distribution facilities. No
power company could force it~ way into the city. The
question is simply one of where it must buy its power.
Telluride is insisting that it must buy its power from
Telluride, (1) because it has been doing so for a period
of ten years, and (2) Telluride is closer to Nephi than
is Utah Power. The argument to follow will demonstrate
that the contentions simply are not sound.
Perhaps one additional fact should be noted. Telluride asserts at page 8 of its brief that its income has
been reduced to the extent of $21,171.07. This is misleading, although we think immaterial. The figure given
is a gross reduction in revenue. From this figure must
be deducted its service costs and the amount which
Telluride would have paid to Utah Power for the power
it would have purchased for resale to Nephi. The net
loss is less than $5,000.00. (R. 159.) We do not think,
however, that this has any materiality to the case. Additional facts will be developed in connection with the law
argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. NEPHI, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS
POWER TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN ITS
OWN POWER SYSTEM, IS NOT SUBJECT TO
'rHE CONTROL OR SUPERVISION OF THE
·PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution of the
State of Utah provides as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''The Legislature shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association,
any power to make, supervise or interfere with
any municipal improvement, money, property or
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise, to
levy taxes, to select a capitol site, or to perform
any municipal functions.''
The foregoing constitutional provisiOn has been
construed by the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of
Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72 Utah 536,
251 Pac. 961. In that case an attempt was made by the
Public Utilities Commission of Utah to fix the rates
charged by the City of Logan to its inhabitants for electric power, provided by their municipally owned plant.
The Supreme Court of Utah held that a municipality has
the right to operate its power facilities for the use and
benefit of its inhabitants without interference or supervision by the Public Utilities Commission. The court
said at page 565 of the Utah Reports :
"We think it clear that the undoubted purpose of
the constitutional provision is to hold inviolate
the right of local self-government of cities and
towns with respect to municipal improvements,
money, property, effects, the levying of taxes, and
the performance of municipal functions ...
''There is still a further constitutional provision
(Sec. 4, Art. 14) of some relevancy to the matter
in hand, which places a limit of indebtedness on
cities and counties not exceeding 4 per centum of
the value of the taxable property therein, with a
proviso, however, that any city or town may incur
a larger indebtedness, not exceeding 4 per centum
additional, 'for supplying such city or. town with
water, artificial lights or sewers, when the works
6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for supplying such water, lights and sewers shall
be ow11ed a·nd controlled by the munic·ipal·ity.'
(Italics added) Such, we think, contemplates that
such utilities as there Pnun1erated shall not only
be owned, but also controlled, by the municipality,
and as indicatiYe of a policy in harmony with the
other constitutional provisions referred to, to hold
inviolate the right and power of a municipality
to do so, and that to delegate a power to a commission or other agency to supervise, regulate
and control the business of such a municipally
owned utility, disapprove contracts, purchases,
and expenditures of the municipality with respect
thereto, and substitute others in lieu thereof, fix
rate and charges under which the utility may be
operated; and to permit the commission to do
what it here in effect did, determine the means or
source by or from which the operating expenses
and bonded indebtedness of the plant or works
must be met, constitute unauthorized interference
with the control of the utility by the municipality.
"We are thus of the opinion that the order made
by the commission, insofar as it affects Logan
City, is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
commission, and therefore is_ annulled and vacated.''
The Logan City case was reaffirmed by the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of Barnes v. Lehi City, 74
Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878, and reaffirmed and distinguished
in the more recent case of Proco City u. Department of
Business Regulation, 218 P. (2d) 675, page 678.
In view of the foregoing constitutional provision
and of the cases construing it, it is clearthat the P.S.C.
has no jurisdiction to regulate a municipally-owned
power plant. To do what petitioner~ now contend (make

7
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Nephi buy from Telluride by prohibiting any other company from selling to Nephi) would by indirection do that
which the constitution would not permit the Commission
to do directly.
POINT II. NEPHI IS NOT THE "TERRITORY" OF
TELLURIDE AND THE COMMISSION HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO C0~1PEL NEPHI TO PURCHASE POWER FROM TELLURIDE.

It is asserted by Telluride that Utah Power has been
ordered to invade Telluride's "territory". It is also
asserted that Utah Power could only sell to Nephi if the
public convenience and necessity required it. Since Telluride can buy all the power Nephi needs from Utah Power,
it can sell Nephi all the power Nephi needs. Thus it is
argued the P.S.C. should compel Nephi to let Telluride
broker the power to Nephi forever; its ten-year contract
to sell power to Nephi makes Nephi Telluride's exclusive
territory and supersedes all the constitutional provisions
which give to Nephi "self-rule" in this field.
The cases simply do not support any such proposition. Were we dealing with an unincorporated area
under the direct control of the P.S.C. (as in cases cited
by Telluride) there would be an exclusive franchise area
which could not be invaded by a second utility unless
the first utility could not render adequate service. Here,
however, Nephi is not the territory of Telluride. There
is no way Telluride could force its way into Nephi. The
P.S.C. could not grant either Telluride or Utah Power
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the right to distribute power in Nephi. Nor could the
P.S.C. regulate X ephi. Nephi could build its own generating plants and not buy power from either. It could
buy power from the Town of Levan or the city of Provo
and the P.S.C. would have absolutely no jurisdiction over
the contract between the rities. Its only concern here is
to see that other customers of Utah Power are not given
-inadeq-uate se n·ice by reason of sales to Nephi. The
P.S.C. could not order Utah Power to sell to Nephi if
Utah Power did not have the facilities, or coul~ only
sell to X ephi by depriving its other customers of adequate-service. Here, the power going to Nephi will come
from Utah Power, in any event. Telluride has not constructed substantial new generating facilities for over
thirty years. (R. 176.) It could only supply Nephi by
continuing to purchase from Utah Power. Thus, it will
not interfere with Utah Power's service to other customers to continue selling power to Nephi. In fact, Mr.
Irvine testified that Utah Power has adequate facilities
to furnish all the power Nephi needs or wants. (R. 107.)
(a) 'rHE CAsEs HoLD THAT NEPHI NEED NoT BuY PowER
FRoM THE NEAREST UTILITY, NoR PERPETUATE THE
ExiSTING CoNTRACT.
Fortunately, we are not here "breaking new
ground". This problem has been before several commissions and the results have been uniform in upholding
our position.
In a very recent case, In reUnion Electric Company
of Missouri, 1951 P. U. R. (X.S.) 428, this identical prob-

9
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lem was presented to the Missouri Commission. There
the city of Rolla had for a number of years been purchasing power from Sho-Me Power Company. Its contract had been terminated and was no longer in effect.
It desired to purchase power from Union Electric Company. Sho-~Ie protested, saying that its service to Rolla
was adequate, and that the loss of revenues would seriously injure Sho-Me. Missouri, like Utah, permits cities
to engage in supplying electricity to their inhabitants
free from regulation by the State Commission. Practically every contention made by Telluride here was
made by Sho-Me in the l\Iissouri case. It had for a number of years had a contract just as Telluride has had a
contract here. The contract had ended as Telluride's
has ended. Its service was adequate, as Telluride contends that its is. The loss of revenues was assured and
the consequences were equally as serious as are presented here. The :Missouri Commission held exactly as
our Utah Commission has held, and in so holding said :
''The Supreme Court in Columbia v. State Public
Service Commission, 1931, 329 Mo. 38, 43 S.W.
(2d) 813, has held that this Commission does not
have authority under the law to regulate municipally owned electric light plants. Since the law
allows municipalities to own and operate electric
plants and systems for the purpose of serving its
inhabitants, and as such are not subject to regulation by this commission, to refuse to permit a
utility under our jurisdiction, able and willing to
contract with the municipality to furnish service
thereto on the sole ground that it would injure
or harm another utility furnishing service to said
municipality; would in effect be doing indirectly

10
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what the law will not permit us to do directlythat i~, exercising jurisdiction over the territory
within the exclusive control of the municipality.
In order for one utility to invade the territory
of another, it would be necessary for said utility
to enter and serve territory belonging to the other.
The City of Rolla and the inhabitants thereof are
as far removed from the territory of Sho-~Ie as
though lying in another state. :MacKay Light &
Power Company v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power
Company (Idaho) P.tT.R. 1920B, 4.
"The Commission has no authority to pass on
the decision of the city of Rolla to cease purchasing its energy requirements from Sho-Me.
"HoweYer, in this case, it can not be said that the
city of Holla is within the allotted service area
of either Sho-~Ie or the applicant. By virtue of
other provisions of our statutes, the city, by its
authorized action, has placed itself beyond the
service area of any utility, since it has elected to
own and operate its own electric system for the
service of the public within its corporate limits.''
1,he identical problem was also presented to the
Idaho commission in the case of MacKay Light & Power
Compan.y v. Ashton & St. Anthony Power Company,
P.E.R. 1920 B, page 4.
In that case the complainant, :MacKay Light & Power
( \_~mpany, had been granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing it to build a transmission line from its plant near Macl(ay, Idaho, to the
Village of Arco, and to furnish electrical energy to said
village and territory adjacent to its transmission line.
Holrever, the Village of Arco desired to purchase power
11
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from the Ashton & St. Anthony ·Power Company. That
company had adequate power to serve the Village of
Arco without in any way interfering with its ability to
serve its present and prospective customers. The Village of Arco owned and maintained a small power plant
operated by a gas engine and such plant was inadequate
and unsatisfactory to meet the needs of the village; and
the people of the village had voted municipal bonds for
the purpose of constructing an electric transmission
line from a connection with the village system across
MacKay Light & Power Company's territory to the system of St. Anthony.
In upholding the right of the village of Arco to construct a transmission line through the territory of the
.JiacKay Light & Power Company, and to purchase its
electric energy from the latter company, the Public
Service Commission of Idaho stated:
''Complainant insists that defendant, by extending its lines to meet or connect with the transmission .line of the village of Arco, even tho11gh such
extension is entirely within territory allotted to
defendant by the Commission, is invading or attempting to invade the territory covered by the
certificate of complainant, thus doing or attempting to do, indirectly what it cannot lawfully do
directly; that since there is no demand for electric
energy for use within defendant's territory to be
delivered at the point where complainant desires
to connect its proposed transmission line with the
defendant's, any action taken by defendant with
the intent and purpose of assisting the village of
Arco in securing electric energy to be used within
:the territory· covered by complainant's certificate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is an unlawful invasion of said territory. On the
other hand, it may be argued that sitH'l' the law
allows municipalities to own and operate electric
plants and systems and specifically exempts them
from the jurisdiction of the commission, the commission, by refusing to permit defendant to furnish electric energy to the village of Arco on the
ground that such enel'KY is to be used within the
complainant's territory, is doing indirectly what
the law says it may not do directly-that is, exercising jurisdiction over the territory within the
exclusive control of the municipality. On the
broad grounds that the best interests of the public
generally in the regard of territories allotted to
complainant and defendant by the Commission,
will best be served by requiring that all the demand for electric energy in such territory be supplied by the utility authorized to operate in that
field or territory, it would appear that the Commission might refuse to permit any current to be
carried without the limits of the territory which
the Commission, in the exercise of its judgment,
has assigned to a particular utility. We cannot,
however, escape the conclusion that the legislature, in exempting municipalities from the jurisdiction of the Commission intended to remove the
territory within the municipality from control of
the commission as completely and effectively as
if it had taken such territory bodily and set it
down without the confines of the other.''
The Commission, therefore, held:
''That the defendant should not be restrained
and enjoined from entering into a contract to furnish or sell and deliver to the village of Arco
electric energy at any point within territory covered by ·the certificate of convenience and necessity issued to said defendant by the Commission,

13
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to. be carried over a transmission line owned by
said village for the exclusive use of said village
within its corporate limits."
We have quoted rather extensively from the case
involving the Village of Arco, because it so perfectly
parallels the situation here. The Idaho Public Service
Commission confirmed the. right of the Village of Arco
to by-pass the closest utility and to go clear through its
territory to acquire power from the Ashton & St. Anthony
Power Company. For the same reasons and considerations, the city of Nephi has the right to by-pass the Telluride Power Company and purchase the power it needs
from the Utah Power & Light Company.
Another case equally in point is Village District of
Belmont v. LaConia Gas and Electric Co. (New Hampshire) P.U.R. 1925 C, page 349. There a city had been
buying power from the Tilton Electric Light Company.
The city board decided, when its contract expired, to buy
power from LaConia Gas & Electric Co. The latter
company refused to sell to the city, because Tilton had
b_een serving the town, and Tilton had adequate facilities
_to cont.i.nue so to do. Tilton intervened and proved that
the loss of revenue would be serious, and that it was willing and anxious to continue to serve the town. Again
we have a direct parallel, in· tliat there was an existing
contract with the first utility, it was rendering adequate
serv!ce. and the· joss of revenlleS. wo~ld ·be· serious. The
~~:~:co~~,·.'!l!Hity .(like: Utah P6wer)· :did not. want to sen·e
~li~:~ to~n.-:· ·st~lf~ _the Commission·_. _required the second

ntU.ity fq

rgnq~r ~~ryice

to .t4e ·_t«J.w~.:
.]A
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8ee also Toll'J/ of J{caruy r. Passaic Cousolida!l'd
Trater Company, 19::!3 B P.lT.H., page --l-:~7. There a town
had by contraet purchased water from the New Jersey
Suburban \Yater Company. Its contract expired. The
town desired to· discontinue purchasing from that company and to eommenee purchasing from Passaic Consolidated \Yater Company. Both the first and the second
companies were regulated utilities. The facts showed
that the Xew Jersey Suburban \Vater Company was
buying water from Passaic and reselling it at an increased price to the town. By making the purchase and
resale, Xew Jersey Suburban Water Company was able
to render· adequate service. It had a big investment in
facilities which we.re constructed to permit delivery of
the water to the town. The loss of the town as a customer
would greatly lessen the value of the facilities. Nevertheless, the Commission held that the town was not required to continue to buy from New Jersey Suburban
Water Company, which desired to continue to serve the
town. The Commission, therefore, ordered Passaic to
permit the connection.
All of- these cases are in point with the decision of
the P.S.C. here. It is- no-t possible to spell out any substanthll difference in any one of them. They are in harmony with lhe Utah Supreme Court~ruling which accords
to X ephi ·the right to operate its own Blectrical distributiOli s·ysterri, free from~ the:~ control of. the Public. S.ervice
Commissicm.. : If: the COJ;nniission is_ permitte!} to shut off
every other availa.ble ~source of electrical energy, it ~an
.G·ompeY by. ..:in-dii:ectio:n. the_ purchase of powe:x: fro~ _Tellu-
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ride. It could thue in violation of the constitution award
Nephi to Telluride. Telluride asks the Court to do this,
because Telluride allegedly needs the revenues.
(b)

'f:aE NEED oF TELLURIDE FoR ADDITIONAL REVENUES
Is IMMATERIAL To THE IssuEs INvoLVED IN THis CAsE.

The cases cited above under subdivision (a) hereof
have uniformly held that the loss of revenues by a particular utility has no bearing whatsoever on the question
of whether a town or city can buy from a different source.
If Nephi elected to build its own generating plant, it
could do so without Public Service Commission approval.
See cases under Point I. Telluride would thus lose the
revenue and no agency would have any power to do anything about it. Telluride could not force its way into
Nephi City. If Telluride really needs the business, and
this is grounds for the Public Service Commission to
indirectly regulate cities, Telluride's weak financial position should be bolstered by letting it broker power to
some of the other cities in the state too. The P.S.C. has
no authority to make any city subsidize Telluride. Telluride has no vested right to broker power to Nephi or
Provo or any other city in the state. It would, of course,
be serious as far as public utilities are concerned if all
of the cities of the state elected to go into the electrical
power business. Utah Power would be seriously injured
if Salt Lake City made that decision. Still, the constitution would permit Salt Lake City to do so, notwithstanding the consequent loss of power revenues to Utah Power.
If every city and town in the state took advantage of its
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constitutional powers, it might wPll be that all utilities
in the state ·would "fold up", but this still does not
change the fact that the constitution has placed this right
in all eitic's and towns, as was pointed out by the court
in the Log a 11 City case, supra. The matter of public convenience and necessity is not controlling insofar as cities
are concerned. The only reason that this matter is before
the P.S.C. at all is that X ephi is seeking to purchase
from a regulated utility. If a sale by that utility would
seriously impair its ability to serve present and prospective customers, the P.S.C. should prohibit the connection. In the relatively recent case of North Salt Lake
r. St. Joseph 1r a fer &; Irrigation Company, (Utah) 223
P. (2d) 577, the court upheld a restriction by the P.S.C.
on new connections, even ·within the franchise area of
St. Joseph. Under that case Utah Power could even be
prohibited from connecting one new customer in the very
heart of its territory if its existing customers could not
be adequately served with the ~ompan.y 's existing capacities. Therefore, no regulated utility C<?uld be r.equired
to sell to any new customer either within or without its
territory, if a sale to such additional customer would
impair its ability to serve its existing customers. This
is the only consideration for the P.S.C. In this case the
record would permit no other conclusion than the one
reached by the P.S.C. That is, that Utah Power has
ample facilities to supply :Nephi City. (R. 107.) In fact,
even if petitioners prevail, Nephi's power will come from
Utah Power through Telluride to Nephi. Since it will
not impair Utah Power's ability to serve its existing or
potential customers, the P.S.C. should not attempt to
17
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prohibit Utah Power from selling to any city and to
thereby compel the city to buy from Telluride or some
other source. As the Missouri Commission said in the
Union Electric Co. case, Nephi is in legal contemplation
as far removed from Telluride's territory as if it were
in another state.
See also Alaba.ma Power Co. v. Guntersville, 117 So.
332, 114 A.L.R. 181, 193, and People v. City of Lovelood,
(Colo.) 230 P. 399, which holds that a city can not be
deprived of its power to control its own affairs by the
fact that a regulated utility has invested large sums in
supplying facilities to serve the city. The court said:
''To hold contrary would assert that no competition in the furnishing of light, power, gas, water
and kindred matters, should be allowed once a
plant has been provided to supply any of them.''
(c) THERE CAN BE No QuEsTION CoNCERNING THE PowER
oF A CITY To BuiLD ITs LINES TO PmNTS BEYOND ITs
CITY LIMITS.
It has been already held by the Utah Supreme Court
that a city may construct lines and build generating
equipment beyond its city limits. The problem was
squarely raised in the case of Muir r. "Afurray City, 55
Utah 368, 186 Pac. 433. In that case the city of :Murray
borrowed money from ~uir for the purpose of constructing an electric transmission line from Murray to the
community of Granite, which was about seven miles
beyond the -Murray city limits. The city attempted to
avoid paying the obligation, by contending that it did
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not have the right to incur an obligation for that purpose.
In holding to the contrary the court said:
''In the case at bar the ei ty had the power to
establish an electric light plant and transmission
line beyond its boundaries, if 1wressary, for the
purpose of supplying light for itself and inhabitants. Com. Laws of Utah 1917, Section 570x2.
It had the power to purchase water rights for
that purpose and pay in cash or by furnishing
power in exchange therefor."
Also, in North Salt Lake

l'.

St. Joseph TVater & Irri.-

gation Company, supra, 223 P. (2d) 577, the court up-

held the right of the Town of North Salt Lake to condemn
the water system of St. Joseph. S t. Joseph was a regulated utility with water rights and facilities in part beyond the city limits.
POI~T

III. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
DID XOT REQUIRE UTAH POWER TO RENDER SERVICE IN AN AREA TO WHICH IT
H.A.S NOT DEDICATED ITS PROPERTY.

Both Utah Power and Telluride have contended that
Utah Po\ver has been required to dedicate its facilities
to serve an area which it has never served and does not
desire to serve. This is wrong as a factual matter, because the record shows that Utah Power has constructed
facilities for delivering power to Mona from whence it
can be transmitted to others for use throughout Southern
Utah. It is wrong as a legal matter, because the P.S.C.
order contemplates that Nephi will come to Utah Power's
lines for its connection..
.19
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(a) UTAH PowER HAs DEDICATED ITs FACILITIEs FoR
GENERATING AND TRANSMITTING PowER To MoNA FoR
UsE IN SouTHERN UTAH.
Whether a public utility has professed to serve a
given area is a question of fact, rather than a question
of law; see United Puel v. P.S.C., 105 West Virginia 603,
144 S.E. 723.
ln view of .Mr. Irvine's testimony, there can be little
merit to this contention by Utah Power. :Mr. Irvine testified that in an agreement with Telluride executed on
July 3, 1929, U tali Power constructed an interconnecting
transmission line from the Santaquin substation of Utah
Power to the Gunnison substation of ·Telluride. Utah
Power has supplied Telluride power through these lines
since November 1, 1929. (R. 98.) On August 5, 1949,
Telluride purchased a portion of the line. Another transmission line between the Hale and Olmsted plants, near
Provo, and ~Iona was constructed by Utah Power to
meet and connect with Telluride's lines at :Mona for the
purpose of supplying additional power to Telluride. (R.
98.) At that time Telluride was serving Nephi. (R. 146.)
It is thus clear that Utah Power constructed two 44 k.v.
lines to :Moua for the express and sole purpose of supplying power to territories in Utah south of :Mona, including
consumption by the inhabitants of Nephi. There is no
substation at l\iona, (R. 103) and distribution would not
be made direct to houses enroute from a 44 k.v.line. Both
petitioners desire to have this court assure to Telluride
the continued right to serve Nephi with power purchased
from r tah Power. No new transmission ·lines are. going
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to be built by rtah Power. The connection is going to
be made in rtah Power's territory. The power is going
to go south to X ephi, as it has done since 1941, except
that now X ephi will have its o\\·n transmission line,
rather than use Telluride's. There is no difference whatever in principle between giving Telluride a connection
with Utah Power's territory and giving Nephi a connection in Utah Power's territory.
Throughout Utah Power's brief it talks about where
it has ''served'' in the past. It says it has never served
the territory south of :Jiona. If the word ''served'' is
used in its technical sense, Utah Power is correct. It has
generated electrical energy and transmitted it to Mona
for use throughout Southern Utah, but it has not served
the territory south of :Mona. Po,cver generated by Utah
Power has been distributed to Nephi, but Utah Power
has not "served" the inhabitants of Nephi. Its service
ends at :Mona, where it delivers the electrical energy to
Telluride, or where it will deliver to Nephi as said by the
Commission in Wis. State R.E.A. vs. Wis. Gas & Electric
Co., 17 P.U.R. ~.S. 31, "The company's obligations end
when it delivers the energy.'' Nephi serves its own inhabitants, and Telluride serves its territory with power
purchased from Utah Power in Utah Power's territory.
The eases cited by Utah Power and Telluride do not prohibit or even suggest that Nephi can not come to Utah
Power's territory and purchase power. Utah Power has
surplus electrical energy for sale. It will deliver the same
within its own territory as it is now doing. The only
change will be that it has changed customers. Its obliga-
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tions in regard to this electrical energy will end at the
point where it delivers the energy to Nephi. This point
will be well within its territory. It is not being required to
extend its lines or to construct new lines into new territories. If Nephi were attempting to compel Utah Power
to build a seven mile transmission line to Nephi, and in
addition to build a retail distribution system throughout
Nephi and to read the meters, hire employees, to service
and maintain the lines, etc., then Utah Power might complain that it was being required to extend service into
new territories. Here, however, it is simply being required to deliver electrical energy at Mona where it
presently is in business and where it presently is selling
to one customer. There is no logical reason why, if it
'has the facilities to do so, it should not also sell to a
second or a third customer. Not a single case cited by
either petitioner is contrary to this proposition.
POINT IV. THE PETITIONERS' AUTHORITIES

.The court will instantly recognize the basic distinction between the present case and all of the cases cited
_by petitioners. Here Nephi is not in fact or legal contemplation the territory of either Telluride or Utah
Power. It is a city _which has been placed by our constitution beyond the territory of either. It is in the language of the cases an "island" or "no man's land". It
was this consideration which led the Missouri Commission to hold in the case of In re Union Electric Company
of Missouri, supra, 1951 P.U.R. (N.S.) 428, that:
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'' ... It cannot be said that the city of Rolla is
within the allotted serYire area of either Sho-Me
or the applicant. By Yirtne of other provisions
of our statutes, the rity, by its authorized action,
has placed itself beyond the service area of any
utility . . . . ''
The same distinction was noted in the MacKay Light
& Pou·er Company r. Ashton&; St. Anthony Power Cumpan y, P. u .R. 1920 B, page 4, where the Commission said :
'' ... \Ye cannot, however, escape the conclusion
that the legislature, in exempting municipalities
from the jurisdiction of the Commission intended
to remove the territory within the municipality
from control of the commission as completely and
effectively as if it had taken such territory bodily
and set it down without the confines of the other."
See also Behnke v. lVisconsin Gas & Electric Co.,
1936, 15 P.U.R. (N.S.) 217, wherein the Commission
ordered a utility into a "no man's land" to serve a territory which was not the admitted territory of either
utility.
There is not a single case cited by petitioners which
involves a similar principle. Each one involves two
regulated utilities ''Tith allotted territories, and the courts
and commissions have correctly held that one utility may
not invade the allotted territory of a second utility. If
Nephi were attempting to purchase power for resale
beyond its city limits in Telluride's territory, we think
a similar holding would have to be reached here. But
where Nephi is going to resell only to its own inhabitants, it is distributing the power in its own territory
23
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and is not infringing Telluride's territory at all. For
example, in Mulcahy v. P.S.C., 101 Utah 245, 117 P. (2d)
298, (cited at page 8 of Telluride's brief) the Fuller'foponce Truck Co. was granted a certificate to operate
as a common motor carrier between Salt Lake City and
Logan. Mulcahy, representing the Utah Idaho Central
Railroad Company, and other transportation companies,
objected to the issuance.
The Indiana case also cited on page 8 deals with
two public utilities, with one attempting to enter the
territory served by the other.
In the In re Bayles case, cited by Telluride on page
10, eighteen individuals wanted an operating permit to
operate in the territory allotted to Dixie Power Company. They were going to buy their power from Parowan
City for distribution and consumption outside the city
limits ~nd in the territory of the Dixie Power Company.
So again there is. an attempt on the part of one group
(not a city) to obtain an operating permit in the allotted
territory of another. In re Streeper, cited on page 11 of
rrelluride 's brief, on.e truck company wanted to compete
with other carriers. between Salt Lake City and Ogden.
This again is an attempt by one utility to operate in the
allotted territory of another. We could go on through
each other case cited by Telluride, but they can perhaps
be equally well covered by the statement that in each
one of them an established territory of one regulated
utility was intended to be invaded by another regulated
utility; The whole basis of the petitioner's argument is
24
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that Xephi is 'l\,lluride 's allotted territory. Petitioner::.;
fail completely to tell the court who allotted Nephi to
Telluride, or how Xephi became rrelluride'::.; tl•lTitory.
It is clear from the record that prior to 1941 Telluride
liad no interest whatever in X ephi. As early as 1903
X ephi was generating electrical energy and distributing
the same to its inhabitants. (R. 129.) Xo agency has
e\·er made any order allotting X ephi to Telluride. Its
only right in connection \Yith ~ ephi came to it by contract
in 1941. Its rights are purely contractual, not vested
or inalienable. The rights having come to it by contract,
expired when the contract expired. There are, of course,
situations where rights are superimposed by statute
upon individuals by reason of their having made a contract. For example, the obligations of workmen's compensation are imposed on the employer-employee contract. \Ve, thus, recognize that from certain contractual
obligations there arise other duties over and beyond
those covered by the contract. In those instances, however, there is a statute which operates on the contractual
arrangement. In the instant case, the petitioners do not
point to any statute which expressly, or by implication,
or at all, says that once a city has purchased power from
a utility the city becomes the territory of that utility.
In fact, no such statute could be constitutionally enacted.
In short, the petitioners simply assume that because
Xephi once made a contract to purchase power from Telluride, Telluride acquired certain inalienable and vested
rights, which did not expire when the contract expired.
Having once had a contract with Nephi, it forever has
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the inalienable and vested right to sell power to Nephi.
The legal procedures or theories establishing this principle are not listed at all by either petitioner. Apparently, petitioners operate upon the theory that if asserted
often enough, the proposition will become sound. Once
there is stripped from their argument the premise that
Nephi is Telluride's territory, the entire argument must
fall. There is not a single case cited by either petitioner
to show that Nephi is Telluride's territory. There is not
a single authority cited to support the proposition that
this contract which has expired gave Telluride vested
and inalienable rights.
CONCLUSION
Under the constitution of the State of Utah, Nephi
may undertake to furnish and distribute electrical energy
to its inhabitants. Nephi has availed itself of this constitutional right. It has since 1903 been furnishing power
to its people, some through its own generating facilities
and some through purchase from the town of Levan,
from the Big Springs Power Company, and from Telluride. Its contract to purchase electrical energy from
third parties did :not abrogate its right to serve its own
territory.. Its purchase contracts did not give Telluride
a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate in
Nephi City. The city is free to build its own generating
plant or to purchase· power wherever power is available.
Telluride's rights are· purely contractual-not inherent
or inalienable. Its contract has expired and Telluride's
right expii·ed with iL
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The cases all hold that Xephi has no obligation to
renew its contract "·ith Telluride, nor to purchase its
power from the nearest utility. rrhe loss of revenue to
Telluride by the expiration of its contract is of no coneern. Prior to 19-±1 it did not ha,·e these revenues aud
no right to have the P.S.C. compel Nephi to contract with
it. Its rights came into existence by contract in 1941, and
expired with the contract in 1951. Utah Power is in business as a public utility offering to serve all customers
within its territory. X ephi, as a separate legal entity and
a customer like any other municipality in Utah Power's
entire territory, and like Telluride, wants to connect to
rtah Power's system 'dthin Utah Power's territory.
Utah Power's obligation will end the moment it delivers
the power to Nephi. It would not be required to service
Xephi's lines, to read meters in Nephi City, or to do anything else beyond the point where it delivers energy to
Xephi. That point will be on Utah Power's existing system within its existing territory. It will simply be selling
to two customers at :\Iona, instead of one. Both of its
customers will take power purchased at :Mona south for
distribution and service in their respective territories.
Nephi will serve within the city limits of Nephi and Telluride will serve its franchise area. There is no additional
burden placed on Utah Power. It will not be required to
geuerate any more power, the power generated will not go
in any different direction. It has ample facilities to connect this new customer to its system. It can serve this
new customer without in any way impairing its service
to others. There is no legal ground whatever for its
refusing to do so. Were this court to hold otherwise it
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would be directing the P .S.C. to unconstitutionally regulate Nephi's affairs. The P.S.C. could not by any direct
order compel Nephi to do business with Telluride. It
must not by indirection do that which the constitution
forbids.
The brief of Telluride advances the proposition that
Nephi City and all of the cities of Southern Utah, within
the area served by it, must forever and a day pay to it
or some brokerage power company its twenty-five per
cent commission for buying and distributing electrical
energy from Utah Power. For over twenty-five years
within the memory of counsel said cities in Southern Utah
have cried for some industrial development. Today as
for the past twenty-five years Nephi City and said cities
of Southern Utah are met with the answer by new indus~
tries seeking to locate here, "Your power costs are too
high", we shall have to locate within the area served by
Utah Power. And that industry has done. Thus, at least
in part, ··have the commercial streams of community
building been turned from the doors of Southern Utah.
Nephi _City fee1s it is grossly urijust that it, and other
adjacent cities of Southern Utah, have thus been sentenced to serve a withering, drying up life process. We
feel we are entitled to make the best arrangement which
can be made to aid Nephi City to grow, and to obtain
cheaper, m?re reliable power is one of the important
m_usts to permit it to grow. Without the granting of the
petition _it can not compete with its neighboring cities on
the _north~
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~
~

It

We respectfully submit that the order of the P.'S.C.
should be affirmed, and that Nephi should be awarded
its costs against both petitioners.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD W. CLYDE
UDELL R. JENSEN
Attorneys for Nephi City
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